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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE E. CHARLTON,
Pl~aintiff and R~espondent,
vs.

C·ase No. 9243

GEORGE L. HACKETT,
Defendant ~and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This 'is an action for breach of con tract. The
contract admitted in evidence as Exhibit 1 is reproduced herein. The ~greement provided for the
exchange by plaintiff, George E. Charlton, of one
jeep and one trailer for 68,333 shares of stock .of
J-A Uranium, Inc. at its par value.
Mr. Ch·arlton delivered the jeep and trailer
but never received 'the stock.
George E. Charlton became acquainted with
(lefendant (appeltant herein) in February 1956.
1
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They met in the office of Ackerson-Hackett Investment Company in the Continentai Bank Bldg., Salt
Lake City Utah ( Tr. 5) . Mr. Charl'ton had been
referred 'to Ackerson-Hackett Investment Company
by an attorney then practicing in this City relative
to becoming underwriter for an issue of secur'ities in
a company Mr. Charlton was in the process of registering with the Utah Securities Commission (Tr.
21).
J

The matter of the underwriting was first discussed and then the m·atter of the exchange which
is the subject of 'this lawsuit (Tr. 22). Mr. Hackett
testified that he stated 'to plaintiff, George Charlton, that he could effeet a transaction on behalf
of the company for the shares of J-A Uranium,
Inc. stock in exchange for the jeep and trailer which
Mr. Charlton was offering for sale (Tr. 20). He
was informed that Ackerson-Hackett Investment
was underwriter for these securities and that a
public offering of the securities was then or would
be commenced shortly (Tr. 26). The stock was to
be delivered to Mr. Charlton upon the conclusion
of the public offer and he was informed that it was
anticip·ated th·at the offering would be concluded
'in approximately ninety days ( Tr. 20). Exh'ibit 1
was 'then prepared and signed by Mr. Charlton. The
offering was never concluded ( Tr. 21) and the
stock not delivered.
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Mr. Charlton commenced_ this action against
Mr. Hackett individually. Defendant contended that
the agreement was with his principal AckersonHackett Inves'tment Company. The court found that
the agreement was wi'th defendant personally and
found that the reasonable value of 'the shares Mr.
Charlton did not receive was 3¢ per sh·are and
awarded judgment for $2049.99.

3
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7.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
P'OINT I
TRE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT GE·ORGE
L. HACKETT WAS A PARTY TO THE EXCHANGE
AGREEMENT.
POINT II
THE CO,URT ERRED IN ASSESSING DAMAGES
IN THE AMOUNT OF $2049.99.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT GE·ORGE
L. HACKETT WAS A PARTY TO THE EXCHANGE
AGREEMENT.

The issue is whether George L. Hac'kett was
acting as agent for a dis1closed principal in this
tranS'action.
Restatement of the Law, Second, Agency 2d,
Vdlume II, §3'20.
"Unless otherwise agreed, a person making or purporting to make a contract with
another as agent for a disclosed principai does
not become a party to the contract.
Comment:
a. Whether or not a person purporting
to act as agent for another becomes a party
to the contract depends upon the agreement
between such person and the other par ty.
See §146. As stated in Section 4, a principal
is disclosed if, at the time of making the contract in question, the other party to it has
ndtice that the agent is acting for a principal
and of the principal's identity. One who purports to con tract on behalf of a designated
person does not manifest by this that he is
making a contract on his own account, and
only where he so manifests does the agen't
become a party to a contract wh'ich he makes
for the principal. In the absence of other facts,
the inferen'Ce is that the parties have agreed
that the princip·al is, and lthe agent is not,
1
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a party. This is true although the agent uses
such an expression as, "I will sell."
Comment:
b. Burden of proof. One bringing an
action upon a contract has the burden of showing that the other is a party to it. This ini'tial burden is satisfied in the plaintiff proves
that the defendant has made a promise, the
form of which does not indicate that it. was
given as agent.''
Restatement of the Law, Second, Agency 2d,
V dlume I, §4.
" ( 1) If, at the time of a transaction
con·ducted by an agent, the other party thereto has notice that the agent is acting for a
principal and of the principal's identity, the
p:rincipal is a disclosed principal.
Comment:
d. . . . . If the manifestations of the
principal or agent ars such as reasonably to
indicate to the other party the identity or
existence of the principal, the la'tter is disclosed or partially disclosed, and this is true
a1though the other party believes that he is
dealing with the agent alone. . . . . "
Restatemen't of the Law, Second, Agency 2d,
Volume I, §9.
"'( 1) A person has notice of a- fact if
he knows the fact, has reason to know it,
shou~l'd know it, or has been g'iven notification of it.
Comment:
d. Reason to know. A person h·as reason
6
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to know of a fact if he has information from
which a person of ordinary intelligence, or
of the superior intelligence wh'ich such. person may have, would i11fer tha:t the fact in
question exists or that there is such a substantial chance of its existence that, if exercising reasonable care with reference to the
matter in question, his ·action would be predicated upon the assumption of i'ts possible
existence. The inference drawn need not be
that the fact exists; it is sufficient that the
l'ikelihood of its existence is so great 'that a
person of ordinary intelligence, or of the superior intelligence which the person in question has, would, if exercising ordinary prudence under the circumstances, govern his
conduct as if the fact existed, until he could
ascertain its existence or non-exis'tence.
Comment:
e. Shou'ld know. A person should know
of a fact if a person of ordinary prudence and
intelligence, or the intelligence which such
person has or professes to have, would ascertain, in the performance of his duty to
another,· that such fact exists or tha t there
is such a substantial chance of its existence
that his action would be predicated upon its
possible existence. The words ''should know''
express the idea tha't the person of whom they
are spoken has a duty to others to ascertain
facts or, if he does not ascertain 'them, to act
with reference to the likelihood that such
fact~. exist.
1

Mr. Charlton testified that Ackerson-Hackett
Investment Company was not mentioned during
7
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their conversations, (Tr. 7) that he made no inquiries concerning the principal (Tr. 15) but admitted th·at the name Ackerson-Hackett Investment
Company appeared on the office door ( Tr. 9) . He
acknowledged th~t the name Ackerson-Hackett Investment Company appeared on the agreement that
he signed (Exhibit 1) and on the stock confirmation he received (Exhibit 2). He did not deny that
he had been referred to Ackerson-Hackett Investment Company by ·an attorney in this City in regard to a proposed public offering of stock in a
company th·at he was registering with the Utah
Securities Commission. There is no direct lestimony
nor ·can ft be inferred, that George L. Hackett made
any promises to plaintiff, George Charlton, in his
individual cap~aeity.
The circumstances surrounding this transaction elearly show the existence and identi'ty of a
princip·a'l, and such being tl1e case, the defendant,
George L. Hacke'tt, was not a party to the con tract.
See State v. Bonnett, 201 P. 2d 939 (Utah).
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POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN ASSESSING DAMAGES
IN THE AMOUNT OF $2049.99.

The lower court awarded judgment to plaintiff for the reasonable value of the shares of stock
that he did not receive under the contract and
found the value to be $2049.99, or 3¢ per share.
As stated in Volume 12A, Fletcher Cyclopedia
Corporations, §5 631,
''If the seller of stock refuses or fails
to perform in accordance with h'is contrac t,
the purchaser may maintain an action for
damages . . . . Ordina1~fl'y the measure of
damages is the difference between the contract price and the market price at the time
and p~ace fixed for delivery .... If the stock
has no market value, the plaintiff is entitled
to recover its actual value to be ascertained
from the value of the corporate assets the
amount of .its liabilities, the dividend earning capacity of 'the stoc kand the like. Nominal damages may be recovered where a breach
of the contract is shown, ·although no damages proved.''
1

See also 18 Corpus Juris Secundum, Corporations §415:
"The value of stock is generally ascertained
by its market value, but resort may be held to other
sources when necessary.
There is no presumption that the face
value of the stock is its real value, and as a
9
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general rule the manner of ascertaining its
va'lue, as a basis for estim·ating damages, is
to show its market value at the time and p1'ace
it should have been delivered, and not as of
the date of the contract. Neither the book
value nor the 'intrinsic value of the stock
should enter into the estimate, unless it has
no market value, in which ca'Se resort may
be had to sources other than the market
value to determine its actual value~ and the
property of the corporation as compared with
.its liabilities at that time m·ay be ·shown,
but the affairs of the corporation cannot be
considered in determining market va1ue,
where there is evidence of several sales of
such stock and the price for which it was
sold, although it is not shown to be the subject of daily 'traffic. In order that stock may
have a market value it is not necessary that it
be the subject of daily traffic by beiing bought
and sold on the streets or in the frequent
dealings of trades people ; it is enough if it
is occasionally the subject of sale or exchange
in the community so as to fix upon the stock
at different times a customary price."
The rule may be stated concisely that the
measure of damages for failure to deliver stock is
the market price, if there is a market for the stock
and if there is no market for the stock, then the
measure of the damages is the actu·al or intrinsic
va'lue of the stock.
The shares of stock of J-A Uranium, Inc. did
not have a market value fron1 the date of the ex10
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change contract, February 15, 1956, to and including the date of trial ( Tr. 24). This fact was testified to by defendant. Plaintiff offered no evidence
to the contrary.
Evidently, the court based its finding of value
on the fact that J-A Uranium, In.c. had or was
about to commence a public offering of stock ·at
3¢ per share, but there is no evidence whatever
of any sales at th·at price. Such being the case, the
court should have looked to the actual value of the
stock and there was no evidence introduced as to
its ac'tu·al value.
''Generally the courts wi'l'l indulge no
presumption as to the value of particular property. Thus, no presumption ex'ists in the
absence of all supporting evidence that corporate stock is worth par or even tha:t i't has
substantial value." 20 Am. Jur. Evidence
§242. 6 A.L.R. 2d 189.
At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, there was
no evidence as to the market value or the actual
value of the stock in question and no evidence of
any sales under the company's public offering.
The defendant's motion to dismiss (Tr. 15) should
have been granted.
GTant vs. I.iovekin, 132A. 342 (Penn.)
Wohlgem~~gh

vs. Mendel, 172 N.Y. Supp. 259
Roder vs. Nz~les, 111 N.E. 340 (Ind.)
11
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CONCLUSION
Appellant contends that the evidence is not
sufficient to sustain the court's findings and judgment on two poin'ts, namely: ( 1) That appellant,
George L. Hackett, was a party to the contract,
and (2) that the value of the shares of J-A Uranium, Inc. ·was 3¢ per share.
(1) The evidence shows that plaintiff-res-·
pondent had notice of 'the existence and identity of
the principal Ackerson-Hack~tt Investment Company, as that term is defined in the Restatement,
and therefore, the complaint of plaintiff should have
been dismissed.
( 2) The record contains no evidence of the
value of the shares of J-A Uranium, Inc. The court's
finding of a Va'lue . was arbitrary and complete'ly
without a· foundation in the record.
- The findings and judgment of the court should
he set aside and the complaint of plaintiff-respondent dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
EDWARD M. GARRETT
Attorney for Appellant
1307 Walker Ban.k Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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